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GEORGE^ERRISON ST ANNA RD, BVT. MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. V 




Imgraved erpresshr lor Pichaldn's BultPiy of Gatlysl'iife 



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A SKETCH OF 



Ti^E jpj^Ti.rr T.A.K:E2sr 



BY 



THE VERMONT TROOPS, 



IN THE battle; OF GETTYSBURGH. 



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BY Ci c! BENEDICT, 

LIEUT. AND A.D. C. 




BURLINGTON : 

® b c jf r c c press 31 s s o c i a 1 i o n , 
1870. 




J5-5 



PREFACE. 

At the request of OfBcers of the Vermont Historical Society, a papet, 
the substance of which is contained in the following pages, was prepared and 
re:id at the special meeting of that Society at Brandon, Yt., January 26th, 
18(i4. The desire expressed by many friends to have it in some more 
accessible and convenient form than as part of the Records of the Society, 
induced the author to print a small edition for private circulation. This was 
soon exhausted. The continued requests for copies ever since, and the 
growing- inteiest mauilested by Vermouters in securing permanent records of 
the late war, have led to the publication of a second edition. 

The position of the writer, on Gen. Stannard's staff, gave him fair oppor- 
tunities for observation of the matters related. He was the first man of his 
Brigade on tlie field, having been sent in advance to announce to the Division 
Commander the approach of the Brigade, and having reached Cemetery Hill 
before the close of the firing on Wednesday, the first day of the battle. His 
post on Thursday was by the side of his General, on Cera3tery Hill, till it was 
exchargf I for the extreme front on the left centre. The moonlit night of 
Thursday he spent in a search for a missing ammunition train which took 
him over the whole ground occupied by our army. His duties called him to 
and fro upon various portions of the field during Thursday and Friday. He 
rode on Saturday over our lines from left to right and over a portion of the 
enemy's position, and on a subsequent visit to Gettysburgh in November 
18G3, he was enabled to verify his impressions by further study of the ground 
and conference with many brave men who stood on those bloody hillsides 
during the great fight. His account of the part taken by the 2d Vermont 
Brigade is that of an actor in or eye witness of almost everything related : 
and of one who has been desirous to know and to set down only the simple 
truth. 

Pressing demands upon his time have not allowed the author to give his 
work a much desired and studied revision in the light of the information 
gained since the close of the war. Such revision however would not partic- 
ularly aff'.-ct the narration of the part tnken by the Vermont troops, but only 
some of the surroundings with wh'ch it is grouped and which are given only 
to show its importance and relaiion to the whole. The importance of that 
part is more and more fully recognized in later histories of the war, and there 
need be little fear that posterity will not fully perceive it. 

For the illustrations in this book the author is indebted to Col. John B. 
Bachelder of Xew York, for whose history of the battle they were engraved, 
and who has kindly allowed this use of them in advance of his own publication. 

Burlington, Vt., 1870. 



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SKETCH OF MANCEUVRES ON GETTYSBU15G. 



VEEMOMT AT GETTYSBUHOII. 



The battle of Gettjsburgh was a notable battle. la respect to 
numbers engaged, loss of life involveil, and importance of results, 
it ranks, bj universal consent, among the great battles of the world. 
It was the culmination of the rebellion, the turning point of the 
great war for the Union ; and it was the only great battle of the 
war fought on the soil of a Northern State. Its claim on the inter- 
est of every American, from such characteristics, is enhanced for 
Vermonters by the fiiet that at three important points on the field 
Vermont troops held the front, and at the two chief crises of the 
battle were largely instrumental, in changing a doubtful fight into 
victory. 

It is no part of the writer's present purpose to sketch in any 
detail the movements preceding the battle. It will be enough if we 
remember that Gen. Lee took across the Potomac, on his northern 
march, the best rebel army at the height of its strength, numbering 
about 100,000 men of all arms; that the Army of the Potomac, 
85,000 to 90,000 strong, had followed, covering Washington, till 
Baltimore was also threatened, and then moving so as to be able 
to intercept him, should he march upon either city ; and that the 
rebel commander, having collected his army in the Cumberland 
Valley, in Pennsylvania, turned southward on the 1st of July, 
1863, through the mountains, to anticipate the Army of the Poto- 
mac in securing the point— the village of Gettysburgh, Pennsyl- 
vania, — at which the main roads cross and diverge to Balti- 



more, Frederick City, Harrisburgh and Washington. I pass over 
all details of the hard and toilsome march, accomplished at the 
rate of nearly twenty miles a day, for ten consecutive days, by 
which our army moved from the Rappahanock to the Pennsyl- 
vania border. I must omit, too, any detailed description of 
the battle of Wednesday, July 1st, begun in the morning by 
Gen. Buford with the Cavalry, two miles north of Gettysburgh, 
opened in earnest by the brave and capable Gen. Reynolds, (who 
was one of its first victims,) with the 1st Army Corps ; sustained 
through nearly two hours of stubborn and at times aggressive fight- 
ing by Gen. Doubleday, who succeeded to the command of the 1st 
Corps ; continued under General Howard with the lOtli and 11th 
Army Corps, till, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, outnumbered and 
outflanked, our forces abandoned the hard and hopeless fight for the 
ridge northwest of Gettysburgh, and retreated to Cemetery Hill, on 
the southern outskirts of the village. That first day's fight has 
been rightly called the Ligmj of the great battle. It was pro- 
nounced by the intelligent correspondent of the London Times with 
the rebel army, "the best contested field that the Army of the Po- 
tomac had yet known." Its cost to us was ten thousand men killed, 
wounded and prisoners — nearly one-eighth of the effective force of 
the Army of the Potomac. Its results were the holding in check 
the rebel army during eight hours of incessant fighting ; the posses- 
sion of the important position of Cemetery Hill on Wednesday 
night, and the lull of Thursday forenoon, which gave rest and respite 
to the shattered remnants of the 1st and 11th Army Corps, now 
reduced to half their former strength, and- enabled the remainder of 
Gen. Meade's army, and its commander, to join tiicm before the 
fighting was renewed. By dark of Wednesday, part of the 3d Corps, 
Gen. Sickles, and the 12th Corps, Gen. Slocum, had arrived upon the 
field ; at midnight Gen. Meade reached the ground, and by seven 



o'clock the next morning the 2d and 5th Corps had arrived, and 
with the rest were posted in the celebrated " horse-shoe " line of 
battle, of which Cemetery Hill was the centre and key. 

Thursday, July 2d — a pleasant summer da}- — passed without 
strife till 3 o'clock, p. m., when its quiet was broken by a movement 
on the part of our army. At the hour named, the 3d Corps, Gen. 
Sickles, swung out from its position on the left of Cemetciy Hill 
and advanced to occupy a low rounded ridge half a mile to the west. 
It was an unfortunate movement. Longstreet, as Gen. Lee states 
in his official report, had been ordered to occupy the same ridge, 
and had already deployed his forces, of Hood's and McLaws' divis- 
ions, for the purpose. His line extended beyond the left flank of 
the 3d Corps, and he met its advance with a sweeping artillery fire 
on front and flank, while Hood and McLaws pressed forward to 
seize the crest. The 3d Corps stood up well to its work. General 
Sickles fell with a shattered leg, but his command held its own and 
even drove back the enemy for a time. Gen. Hood lost an arm 
and was taken from the field. His successor. Gen. Robertson, was 
also wounded, and it was not till Longstreet headed a charge in 
person that the line of the 3d Corps became broken. It fell back, 
leaving the ground strewn with its dead. Longstreet now followed 
up his advantage sharply, and made a determined efibrt at once to 
turn Gen, Meade's left and break through on the left centre. The 
attack on the extreme left was repulsed with hard and bloody fight* 
ing by the 5th Corps, Gen. Sykes, which as the assault on the 3d 
Corps opened had just formed its line in the rear and to the left of 
the 3d Corps. The broken lines of the 3d were enabled to form 
afresh in the rear of the 5th, while the latter stubbornly held its 
ground, with the support of a portion of the Gth Corps, now just 
arrived upon the field. The left of the 5th Corps extended to Littlo 
Round Top Hill, and desperate fighting took place for the possession 



of tliat hill. The enemy were repulsed at its foot by a brigade of 
the 5th Corps, consisting of the IGth Michigan, 44th New York, 
83d Pennsylvania, and 20th Maine, which not only maintained its 
position, with a loss of the brigade commander, Col. Vincent, and 
50 per cent, of its numbers killed and wounded, but captured some 
300 prisoners. The hill was finally occupied by the 20th Maine, 
Col. Chamberlain, and a battery was placed on its summit, which 
made a fortress of it and assured the safety of Gen. Meade's ex- 
treme left. 

The attempt on the left centre came nearer to succeeding when 
success for it would have been bitter disaster for our army. The 
rout of the 3d Corps left open large intervals in our lines to the left 
of Cemetery Hill. A portion of the troops brought down by Gen. 
Hancock, commanding that wing, to fill the largest gap, had broken 
for the rear under the pressure of Longstreet's advancing columns. 
The federal batteries to the south of the hill were left without sup- 
port. One of them had actually fallen into the hands of the enemy, 
when the Vermont 2d Brigade, of the 3d (Doubleday's) Division of 
the 1st Corps, then lying behind Cemetery Hill, was put into the 
gap and re-established the line. 

This service was important enough to be described a little more 
in detail. 

To go back a little — the 2d Vermont Brigade, consisting of the 
12th llegiment. Col. A. P. Blunt; 13th, Col. F. V. Randall; 14th, 
Col. W. T. Nichols; 15th, Col. Ecdfield Proctor, and 16th, Col. W. 
G. Veazey, Vermont Regiments, under command of Brigadier Gen- 
eral GEonaE J. Stannard, had been assigned to the 3d division of 
the 1st Corps, when the army passed the line of the Occoquan ; but 
leaving that line a day behind the Corps, it had not been able, though 
marching hard and gaining gradually on the Corps, to make an ac- 
tual junction with it before the battle. The 12th and 15th Regi- 



monts were detached at Einmetsburgh, by order of Major General 
Reynolds, to guard the Corps trains. On the afternoon of Wednes- 
day, July 1st, in compliance with an order of Gen. Sickles, the 15th 
Regiment rejoined the brigade on Cemetery Hill, and remained there 
through the night, and until noon of the 2d, when it was sent back 
by Gen. Doubleday to guard the ammunition train, then parked at 
Rock Creek Church, about two and a half miles from the field. 
The 12th and 15th Regiments were sent back to Westminster from 
there ; and thus, while doing important duty and going where they 
were ordered, had no opportunity to sbare in the glory and dangers 
of the actual conflict. 

The Brigade, thus for the time being reduced to three Reori- 
ments, did its utmost on Wednesday, hurried forward by the sound 
of cannon and by couriers from Gen. Doubleday, to reach the field 
in time to take part in the first day's fight. It succeeded only in 
reaching the ground as the last guns were fired from Cemetery Hill. 
It marched in on the left, over ground which was occupied by the 
enemy next morning, and after some marching and counter-marching, 
under contradictory orders from difiierent corps commanders, three 
of whom assumed immediate command of the Brigade, was allowed 
to halt and drop to rest on the left of Cemetery Hill, Gen. Stan- 
nard was appointed general field ofiicer of the day, or of the night 
rather, for that portion of the field, and a picket detail of 200 men 
of the 16th Regiment was posted in front, relieving cavalry who 
had been doing that service. Thursday morning the Brigade was 
moved to the rear of Cemetery Hill, and five companies of the 13th, 
under command of Lieut. Col. Munson, were detached as a support 
to one of the batteries on the Hill. Company B, of the IGth, wa.s 
also detached to strengthen the skirmish line on the left front of 
Cemetery Hill, and did not rejoin the regiment till the close of the 
battle. While stationing these skirmishers, Capt. A. G. Foster, 



Acting Inspector General on Gen. Stannard's staff, was shot through 
both legs, the first officer of the Brigade that was hurt by a rebel 
bullet. The shells burst thickly over the Brigade during the severe 
shelling of Cemetery Hill, whioh accompanied the assault on our 
left on Thursday afternoon, and a few men were wounded by the 
pieces. Gen. Stannard was placed for a while in charge of the po- 
sition occupied by the batteries on the top of the hill, and took his 
post where the Tancytown road crosses the brow of the Iliil, — a 
convenient spot for observation of the enemy, but sufficiently dan- 
gerous from the attention paid to it by both the rebel artillery and 
sharpshooters. The regiments of his command, however, lay below 
the crest, and had nothing to do till late in the afternoon, when or- 
ders came which hurried them to the left and front, into the fight of 
which they had thus far heard much but seen little. They were sent 
by Gen. Doubleday to the rescue and support of the batteries on the 
left centre, which the enemy, following up the retreat of the Sd 
Corps, were now assaulting with infantry. The 1 -1th Begiraeut, Col. 
Nichols, led the way, and forming in line of battle, moved forward 
under a sharp fire to the rear of a battery from which the supporting 
infantry had just retired in confusion. The enemy fell back as they 
advanced, and the firing soon ceased at that point. The 16th Regi- 
ment, Col. Veazey, which followed the 14th, also found in front of 
it a battery without support, and supported it till dark— 'losing a few 
men by cannon shots. The right wing of the 13th — the left wing 
of the regiment, it will be remembered, was supporting a battery on 
Cemetery Hill, and had not 3fot come up, — Avas brought forward in 
the rear of the position of a battery which had just fallen into the 
hands of the enemy. The gunners had fled from their guns or fallen 
under them. The rebels had laid hold of the pieces. In another 
moment they would have been turned upon us. At this moment 
Col. Ivaudall, whose horse had just been shot under him, and who 



was marching on foot at the head of his regiment, was addressed by 
Gen. Hancock, who had been endeavoring to rally the panic-stricken 
supports of the battery, with the question, if he could re-take that 
battery? " Ws can ! Forward, boys !" was the reply; and in they 
went. The battery was saved, and the guns were passed to the rear; 
but the 13th did not stop there. Pushing on with his men Col. Ran- 
dall advanced to the Emraetsburgh road, half a mile to the front, 
and captured there two 12 lb. brass guns, brought down by the enemy 
while following up the 3d Corps. These were the only guns taken 
by our forces from the hands of the enemy during the battle, thouo^h 
another piece, abandoned by the rebels in their retreat, fell into our 
hands subsequently. A company of about forty rebels, with their 
Captain, were taken prisoners in and about Eogers' house, on the 
Emmetsburgli road, by Company A of the loth at this time. Col. 
Ilandall remained with his regiment in this advanced position till 
dark, when he was ordered back by Gen. Stannard to the main line. 
At the close of the day the Brigade thus occupied the front line on 
the left centre, and held it thenceforward to the end of the battle. 

While these events were in progress, on the left wing. General 
Meade's centre and right had been subjected to a shelling, which was 
only eclipsed by that on the left centre the day following. At five 
o'clock the enemy, probably surmising (which was the fact) that our 
right had been weakened to reinforce the left, made a determined 
attack on our extreme right. The ground here is high and broken, 
rising into a rocky eminence, known as Culp's Hill, with two sum- 
mits, whose steepest inclines faced the enemy to the north-east, sep- 
arated by a ravine strewn with large granite blocks. Ilill and val- 
ley were wooded with a fine growth of oak. The whole position 
here had been made very strong by substantial breastworks of felled 
trees and piled stones. Culp's Hill was held by Gen. Wadsworth, 
with the remnant of his division of the 1st Corps, and by Gen. 



8 

Geary's division of tho 12th, until the latter part of the afternoon, 
when Geary was ordered with two brigades of his division across to 
the left of the field to reinforce Sickles. Gen. Greene's brigade of 
Geary's division remained and manned the breastworks through the 
ravine. About 7 o'clock the famous Stonewall Brigade, of Early's 
Division of Ewell's Corps, formed column in mass, and marched 
boldly up the steepest part of Culp's Hill, against what they sup- 
posed to be our extreme right. They met the 7th Wisconsin and 
95th New York Volunteers, who received them with a fire of mus- 
ketry which piled the ground in front of the entrenchments with 
rebel dead. Foiled in his attack in column, the enemy deployed to 
his left in line and furiously attacked Gen. Greene's Brigade. They 
met again a welcome of rolling volleys, and, foiled at every point, 
fell back to the foot of the hill, where, covered by the trees and rocks, 
they kept up, till 9 o'clock, a close but comparatively ineifective fire 
on our whole position on the right. 

This assault on the right was a terribly expensive operation for 
the enemy, and fruitless with one important exception. At the point 
where the removal of Geai-y's troops left the breastworks undefended 
the rebels gained an entrance. Fortunately, the darkness made it 
impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and prevented them from 
taking advantage of their success that night ; and in the morniuof 
they found a different situation of affairs. 

The night passed quietly on our lines, and our Generals doubt- 
less took courage as they looked the situation over. We still held 
our own. We had suffered terribly on the left, but had balanced the 
account by the slaughter of rebels on the right, and our army was 
now all vpon the (jround. 

The 2d Vermont Brigade slept upon its arms, with the excep- 
tioa of the IGth Regiment, whicli, under direction of Col. Veazey, 
who was general field officer of the day, was posted on the picket 



9 

line, — three companies deployed on the line, and the remainder of 
the regiment in reserve. Daring the night word was brought by a 
prisoner to Col. Nichols that the rebel Gen. Barksdale lay mortally 
wounded on the field in front of his line. Col. Nichols at once sent 
out a detail of eight men vmder Sergeant Yaughan, (a brave soldier 
who fell nest day,) who brought him in on a stretcher and took him 
to a small temporary hospital in the rear. His last message, " Tell 
my wife I fought like a man and will die like one," was delivered to 
Sergeant Vaughan, and his hat and gloves, which he gave to one of 
the men who brought him in, are now in Col. Nichols' possession. 
His body, with a ball-hole through his breast, and legs bandaged and 
bloody from gun-shots through both of them, lay in the rear of the 
position of the Vermont Brigade during the forenoon, and was then 
temporarily interred upon the spot. 

Friday, the last great day of the battle, opened with a simulta* 
neous cannonade at daylight on right and left, — -on the left from 
Louo-street's batteries along the low ridge he gained the afternoon 
before. This was to attract attention to that part of the field, while 
Ewell should make good his foot-hold on the right. It received but 
small response from our batteries, and died away in an hour or so* 
On the right our own guns opened the day. Several batteries had 
been collected there to shell the enemy out of the woods near the 
Baltimore road, where he had gained entrance the evening before j 
but, owing to the nature of the ground, which prevented a very ef* 
fective artillery fire, the cannonade hefe too mainly ceased, and a 
terrific infantry fight succeeded. Gen. Geary had returned during 
the night, charged with the duty of re-oecupyitig the breastworks at 
the head of the ravine. He found himself at first the attacked rather 
than the attacking party. Early, supported by Rhode's Division, 
pressed forward to secure the advantage he had partially gained the 
night before. It is said he had sworn he would break through oil 
2 



10 

our right if it cost him his last man. If so, he was forsworn. For 
six hours — from 5 till 11 o'clock — the musketry rolled on those hill- 
sides in one incessant crash. For six hours, from other portions of 
our lines, we watched the white smoke-clouds curling up through the 
tree-tops, and wondered what the issue would be. At 11 Geary had 
driven the enemy back over the breastworks into the valley below. 
Gen. Greene, after repulsing another desperate assault on his line) 
made a sally and drove the rebels from his front, capturing three 
colors and some prisoners. Early retired terribly broken, and the 
battle was over for good on the right. The rebel dead at its close 
covered the ground from the front of our breastworks to the foot of 
the ravine. Our own loss on the right was quite small. 

To return to the left centre: The 2d Vermont Brigade took 
its share of the opening cannonade in the morning and lost a few 
men by it. The 14th Regiment, in particular, had several non- 
commissioned officers and men killed at the same instant, by the ex- 
plosion of a caisson of the battery close to which they were lying. 
Just after the enemy's batteries opened in the morning, Col. Nichols 
received permission to move his regiment forward about ten rods to 
a position where some scattered trees and bushes afforded a partial 
shelter for his men. The 14th took up the position during the can- 
nonade, and remained substantially in that position thenceforward 
through the battle. The 13th Regiment lay to the right and a little 
to the rear of the 14tli. On the right and a few rods to the rear of 
the 13th, extended the lines of the 2d Corps. About half of the 
16th Regiment was upon the skirmish line in front, disposed for the 
most part in picket posts, rather than strictly as skirmishers, and the 
other half of the regiment was held in reserve in their rear. 

The troops of Gen. Doubleday's division were disposed in three 
parallel lines of battle. There were two reasons for this show of 



11 

strength. la the first place the comparatively level and open nature 
of the ground at that point invited assault. In the second place our 
Division and Corps Generals doubtless distrusted the ability of the 
Vermont nine-months troops to withstand a charge. It was owned 
that they did well the night before, when their prompt and eager 
presence apparently saved the day in that pai-t of the field; but it 
was known — and it was about all that icas known about them in the 
Army of the Potomac — that they were nine-monlhs men, their term 
of service just expiring, and that they had had no previous experi- 
ence under fire. They were therefore expected to break at the first 
earnest onset of the enemy, and a double line of battle was placed 
behind them, — quite a needless precaution, as it proved. 

With the exception of some scattered firing on the skirmish line, 
no fighting took place on the left during the forenoon of Friday. 
The only farther preparation to resist an attack that under the cir- 
cumstances could be made in that portion of the field, was attended 
to. It was to collect the rails lying where the dividing lines of the 
fields had ran, and to pile them into breastworks. There were not 
enough of them to make a breastwork proper, anywhere ; but they 
sufiiced for a low protection of from two to three feet in height, 
which would shelter men lying flat behind them, and we found that 
every such help was needed before the day was done. 

For two hours succeeding the close of the musketry fight on the 
right, almost absolute quiet prevailed along the lines. Occasionally 
only, a distant cannon shot boomed from the northeast, where Gregg 
with the cavalry was harassing the enemy's left and rear. The si- 
lence else was oppressive. The batteries frowned like grim bull-dogs 
from the opposing ridges, but not a shot was fired. The great fea- 
ture of the day — and a grander one has seldom been witnessed in 
the history of human warfare — was in preparation, — the charge of 
an army; for the body of infantry which Longstrcet had been mar- 



12 

shaling during the foreuoon for the great assault on our left centre, 
was an army in itself That charge has commonly been known as 
the charge of Pickett's Division, — a most inadequate title. The 
troops composing it were not one but three divisions (lacking one or 
two brigades) of the rebel army. They were Pickett's Division of 
Longstreet's Corps ; Heth's Division of Hill's Corps, commanded by 
Pettigrew, Heth having been wounded the day before; and two-thirds 
of Pender's Division of the same Corps, commanded by Trimble, 
Pender being also wounded. Pickett, as stated by the correspondent 
of the London Times, by the Richmond Press, and by prisoners 
taken, took not less than 4,300 men of his division into that charge. 
Pettigrew's was a strong division, made stronger by the addition of 
Wilcox's Brigade of Anderson's Division, and numbered, on the same 
authority, 10,000 men. The tv/o brigades of Pender's Division 
probably numbered not less than 2,500 men. The English officer 
who wrote the account of the battle in Blackwood's Magazine, says 
Longstreet told him afterwards that the great mistake on their side 
was in not making the attack on Friday afternoon v/ith 30,000 men 
instead of 15,000. They made it, as the figures given above show, 
with about 17,000. 

The grand assault Avas heralded by a cannonade of equally tre- 
mendous proportions. The London Times'' correspondent states that 
140 guns were in position opposite our left centre, without counting 
Ewell's batteries on the right, which, he adds, "made a concert of 
about 200 guns." There was doubtless concentrated on our left 
centre the fire of from 140 to 150 pieces — a fire with hardly a par- 
allel in field operations. The famous cannonade with which Napoleon 
preceded the decisive charge at Wagram was of but 100 guns, and 
that of Ney at Borodino of but 80, 

At ten minutes past one o'clock the signal gun was fired ; the 
rebel pieces were run to the top of the ridges which had concealed 



13 

their movementrf from us; and iu an instant the air seemed literally 
filled with flying missiles. It was a converging fire which came 
upon our lines at every angle, from direct point-blank at a range at 
which grape was served with effect, to an enfilading fire, from a bat- 
tery of Whitworth guns far to the right, which sent their six-sided 
bolts screaming by, parallel to our lines, from a distance of over two 
miles. Shells whizzed and popped and fluttered on every side ; 
spherical ease shot exploded over our heads, and rained iron bullets 
upon us ; solid shot tore the ground around us, and grape hurtled in 
an iron storm against the low breastworks of rails. About ninety 
guns replied from our side. It is impossible to describe such a can- 
nonade. It may assist the imagination, however, to recollect that a 
field piece, actively served, is discharged with ease twice in a minute. 
The 240 guns in action probably gave over 350 discharges a mmute, 
and, adding the explosions of tho shells, it is not extravagant to 
estimate that in many a minute of those two hours the explosions 
amounted to 600 ; and this without count of the musketry. The 
din of the cannonade was compared, by the English writer I have 
quoted, to " the thundering roar of all the accumulated battles ever 
fought upon earth rolled into one volume." The sound was distinctly 
heard at Greensboro, Green County, Peun., 143 miles in a direct 
line from Gettysburgh. 

This cannonade was iu due accord with the precepts of modern 
military science. The article on artillery iu the New American En- 
cyclopedia closes as follows : 

" The grandest results are obtained by the reserve artillery, in 
" great and decisive battles. Held back out of sight the greater part 
'<of the day, it is brought forward in mass upon the decisive point, 
"when the time for the final effort has come. Formed in a crescent 
"a mile or more in extent it concentrates its destructive fire upon a 
♦' comparatively small point. Unless an ec|ual number of guns ia 



14 

" there to meet it, half an hour's rapid firiug settles the matter ; the 
" enemy begins to wither under the hailstorm of howling shot; the 
" in-tact reserves of infantry advance, — a last sharp struggle, and 
" the victory is won. Thus did Napoleon prepare McDonald's ad- 
" vance at Wagram, and resistance was broken before the three 
" divisions advancing in column had fired a shot or crossed bayonet 
"with the enemy." 

Gen, Lee followed closely the general plau thus laid down, but 
there were some variations in details. Instead of half an hour of 
rapid firing, he gave two hours. There was another important vari- 
ation, — the troops sustaining " the hailstorm of howling shot " did 
not " wither " according to the programme. Creeping close under 
the low protection of rails they had piled in the forenoon, and hug- 
ging the ground, heads to the front and faces to the earth, our men 
remained immovable in their lines. The general, staff and field offi- 
cers alone, as their duties required, stood erect or moved irom their 
places; all else needed little caution to keep down — even the 
wounded, for the most part, remained and bled quietly in their 
places. Col. Veazey, of the IGth Vermont Regiment, in a recent 
letter to the writer, recalls a most remarkable eflPect of the cannon- 
ade on his men, who, it may be premised, had been on picket the 
nitrht before, and, in common with the rest of the Vermont Brigade, 
(the 14th Regiment excepted) had been almost without food for 
twenty-four hours. He says : " The effect of this cannonade on my 
" men was the most astonishing thing I ever witnessed in any battle. 
"Many of them, I think a majority, fell asleep, and it was v>'itu the 
"greatest efi'ortonly that I could keep awake myself, notwithstanding 
"the cries of my wounded men, and my anxiety in reference to the 
"more fearful scenes which I knew would speedily follow." The por- 
ticm of his regiment of which he .-speaks was lying at this time in 
front of and almost under the nuizzlcs of our own batteries, which 



15 

fired right over them. Of course the rest obtained under such cir- 
cumstances could have been nothing more than a stunned and weary 
drowse. The eifect of this awful cannonade was especially noticeable 
on the batteries which occupied the crest on our side, and which were 
for the most part without any protection. They stood stoutly to 
their work, but suffered greatly in both men and horses. Four 
caissons of Thomas' battery in position to the right and rear of the 
Vermont 2d brigade, were blown up at once by the enemy's projec- 
tiles. There was a scene of great confusion around it for a moment 
as the thick cloud of smoke, through which shot fragments of ex- 
ploding shells, rolled up, and mutilated horses were seen dashing 
wildly to the rear ; but another battery wheeled promptly into its 
place, and before the rebel cheers which greeted the sight from the 
opposite ridge had died away, our fire opened with fresh vigor from 
the spot. Cushing's battery, further to the right, lost 63 of the 84 
horses attached to it. 

The cannonade ceased on the rebel side shortly after 3 o'clock, 
and the grand charge followed. The assaulting forces were formed 
in two lines, with a front of about 1,000 yards, with supports in the 
rear, extending beyond the flanks of the front lines. The ground 
selected for this movement was the only portion of the whole field 
over which so many men could have been rushed in line. It was a 
broad stretch of open meadow ground, extending from the left of 
Cemetery Hill to the southwest, perhaps a mile and a half in length 
and varying from half a mile to a mile in width between the con- 
fronting ridges. It sloped gently for most of the distance, from the 
summit occupied by our batteries, for half the way across, and then 
rose with like gentle incline to the enemy's position. 

The advance of the enemy was deliberate and steady. Pre- 
ceded by their skirmishers the long gray lines came on at common 



16 

time, till they reached the lowest ground half way across the open 
interval, when the Vermont Kegiments, which, it will be remem- 
bered, occupied a position advanced from the general front of the 
army, were ordered up in line by Gen. Staunard. The enemy's 
right was now aiming apparently directly upon the 14th Regiment ; 
and the order was sent to Col. Nichols, by Gen. Stannard, to hold 
his fire till the enemy was close upon him, then to give him a vol- 
ley, and after that the bayonet. A sudden and unexpected move- 
ment of the enemy rendered the execution of this order impractica- 
ble. At the instant that our troops rose the rebel force in front 
suddenly changed direction by its left flank, and marched to the 
north across our front for some sixty rods, when, again fronting, it 
came in upon the line of the 2d Corps, to our right, held by Webb's, 
Harrow's, Hall's and Carroll's Brigades, and Rorty's, Cushing's, 
Arnold's and Woodruff's Batteries. The exact occasion of this 
singular and dangerous side-movement on the part of the enemy was 
not apparent at the time. It appeared, from the position occupied 
by the Vermont 2d Brigade, to be participated in by the whole at- 
tacking force, and to have been caused by the sudden appearance of 
a body of troops in firm line, much nearer to them than they ex- 
pected, on ground from which they supposed all opposing forces bad 
been swept away by their batteries. The fact was, however, that 
the left of the rebel line came in direct ; but taking an oblique di- 
rection, their right became separated from it, and was obliged to 
march to the left to close the interval. It was a terribly costly 
movement for the enemy. Tlie 14th Regiment, upon its commence-' 
ment, at once opened fire by battalion, and continued it by file, at 
about sixty rods distance, with very great effect. The 13th joined 
its fire with the 14th, and a line of dead rebels at the close showed 
distinctly where they mai-ched across the front of the Vermonters. 
As the rebel lines froiited and advanced after this side movement, 



17 

they swung partly to the rear on their right, and becoming massed, 
presented from some points of view the appearance of a column 
massed by regiments ; and the force is so described in some of the 
regimental and brigade reports. With a wild yell which rose above 
the roar of cannon and musketry, the rebels now came in on the 
charge. Our batteries, firing grape and canister, opened cruel gaps 
in their lines from front to rear. The 2d Corps met them in front 
with a destructive musketry fire, but they still swept on. They 
reached, pressed back, actually broke through our lines. The rebel 
Gen. Armistead had his hand on one of our guns when he was shot 
down. The general advance of the enemy was as yet unchecked, 
when a sudden assault on their right changed the aspect of aff^airs. 
The opportunity for a flank attack had been noticed by Gen. Stan- 
nard, and acted on with a decision and promptitude which did him 
infinite credit. Without hesitation he ordered the 18th and 16th 
Regiments out upon the enemy's flank. They marched perhaps 
sixty rods parallel to the main line, and then changing front their 
line swung out nearly at right angles, on the right of the rebel force, 
which was still pushing resolutely forward, intent only on overcom- 
ing the resistance directly before them. The 13th Regiment moved 
first, and, marching by the right flank, approached so near the ene- 
my's right that Gen. Stannard feared for the moment that his order 
had been misunderstood, and sent an order to "change front forward 
on first company" at once. This was immediately done. The ex- 
treme left of the battalion, as it swung out into the scattering fire 
now opened from the enemy's flank, faltered for a moment. There 
was danger for the instant that the hesitation and disorder might 
extend down the line, and endanger the success of the movement ; 
but the few men who had begun to hang back and look to the rear 
were promptly faced into line by a staff officer ; and a line of fire 
ran down the front of the regiment, as it opened at half pistol range 
8 



18 

upon the enemy. The IGth Regiment now came down and formed 
on the left, and, once engaged in firing, all were so eager that it was 
with difficulty they were induced, after the enemy in front of them 
had surrendered, to perceive the fact and stop. The front of our 
regiments, where they opened fire, was hardly a dozen rods from the 
enemy's flank, and they advanced while firing, so that that distance 
was much lessened. At this short range the 13th fired ten or fifteen 
rounds, and the 16th probably half that uum])cr, into a mass of men 
on which every bullet took effect, and many doubtless found two or 
three victims. The eff"ect upon the rebel lines was instantaneous. 
Their progress ceased close upon the low breastworks of the 2d Corps. 
For a moment they crowded together in bewilderment, falling like 
wheat before the reaper ; then breaking into a disorderly mob, they 
fled in all directions. The larger portion, on their right and centre, 
dropped their arms and rushed within our lines as prisoners. On 
their left, where Pettigrew's Division had made a less resolute ad- 
vance, the larger portion retreated whence they came. Their dead 
and wounded and small arms by thousands strewed the ground over 
which they charged.* 

But the work on the left centre was not yet ended. The rebel 
brigade, which formed the support to Pickett's Division, on the right, 
was now advancing across the open fields. It did not follow the 
flank movement whicli had proved so disastrous to the main column. 



*The severity of the fighting and the carnage, during the actual shock and crisis 
of the great assault, has been seldom equalled. Of Pickett's Division, which, 
having the right, took the full brunt of tho Vcrmonters' fire, the rebel historian, 
Pollard, says : " The havoc in its ranks was appalling. Its losses on this day are 
" laniou<, and should be commemorated in detail. Every lirigadier in the Division 
'■ was killed or wounded. Out of twenty-four regimental ofiicers only two escaped 
" unhurt. The Colonels of live Virginia regiments were killed. The 'Jth Virginia 
" went in 250 strong, and came out with only liS men, while the equally gallant 
" lUth rivalled the terrible glory of such devoted courage." 

liaohclder, in his Key to the Battle of Gettysburgh, says : " On tho Union side, 
" Generals Hancock, Gibbon, Webb and Stannard were wounded; on tho enemy's 
"side. Generals Armistcad and Garnet were killed, and Generals Kemper, Petti- 
" grew, Trimble, and Colonel Nyo commanding Archer's Brigade, were wounded, all 
" within fifteen minutes time, and within a hundred and fifty yards of a common 
" centre.'' 




•r^^k 5 



*^^ 



19 

but marched straight forward, directing its course upon the position 
of the 14th Regiment, The 14th received it with a hot fire in front, 
while the 16th, (which had been already faced about by Col. \'easey 
and started back in anticipation of the order,) was ordered back to 
take them on the flank. The 13th was at the same time directed to 
resume its former position. The enemy's batteries, -which had ceased 
their fire, now reopened with redoubled fury, and shot and }«hell tore 
thickly through the ranks of our regiments, as these orders were 
obeyed. They sustained it without being thrown into disorder, some 
of the rebel accounts to the contrary notwithstanding. The 13th 
resumed its place in the line in good order, while the 16th, marching 
by flank, hurried back at double quick across the open field, losing 
many men killed or wounded, but keeping its formation as perfectly 
as if marching on parade. Soon changing front to the left, the 
regiment formed in line of battle, facing obliquely the left flank of 
the rebel force, now brought nearly to a halt by the front fire. At 
Col, Veazey's request, preferred in person to Gen. Staunard, he was 
now given permission to charge. The regiment fell upon the enemy's 
flank, cheering, with bayonets at a charge, and without firing a shot. 
The movement was so sudden that the rebel commander could efiect 
no change of front to meet it, and the 16th swept down the line of 
three regiments, taking their colors and scooping them in a body into 
our lines. The prisoners were for the most part passed over to the 
troops in our rear at once, and the exact number taken by the Ver- 
mont troops is not known. Of the rebels engaged in the great charge 
3500 were left in our hands as prisoners. Nearly as many more 
were killed or wounded. The remainder, in scattered squads, re- 
treated beyond the low ridge and were lost to our view. The colors 
taken by the 16th were those of the 8th Virginia, the battle flag of 
another regiment, which was lost by the fi^U of the man who took it 
apd was brought in by other parties, and the colors of the 2d Florida, 



bounded. 


Missinj 


89 


26 


68 


22 


89 


15 



20 

a beautiful silk flag bearing a rising sun with the inscriptions " Wil- 
liamsburgh" and "Seven Pines." The 16th occupied for a while a 
position on the left, taken by them after the charge, under the final 
cannonade of the enemy which they opened on friend and foe alike, 
and was supported for a short time there by four companies of the 
14th, under Lieut. Col. Rose. The regiments were then all brought 
back to the original line and remained there till ten o'clock in the 
evening, when they were withdrawn a short distance to the rear and 
allowed to bivouac for the night. 
The loss of the brigade was : 
Killed. 
Of the 13th Regiment, 8 

" " 14th " 17 

'• " 16th " 14 

Totals : 39 killed, 246 wounded, 63 missing — aggregate, 348. 
During the last sharp shower of grape and shell, with which 
the enemy strove to cover his repulse. Gen. Stannard was wounded 
in the leg by an iron shrapnel ball, which passed down for three 
inches into the muscles on the inside of the thigh. His wound was 
very painful till a surgeon came (which was not for an hour) and 
removed the ball ; but, though strongly urged, he refused to leave 
the field. He remained in front with his men till his command \vas 
relieved from duty in the front line, till his wounded had been re- 
moved, and arrangements made for burying the dead ; when, having 
done all that could have been asked even of a man whole in flesh, 
the high spirit and stern purpose which had thus far sustained his 
body against pain and loss of blood, relaxed, and he sank fainting 
to the ground. To his perfect coolness, close and constant presence 
with his men, and to the promptness — almost inspiration — with 
which he seized the great opportunity of the battle, was very greatly 
pwin^ the glorious success of the day. 



- o 

£•0 

■- X 




21 

Major General Hancock rode down to speak to Gen. Stannard, 
and fell, while addressing him, close to the front line, just after the 
flank attack had been ordered. He was caught, as he sank from his 
horse, by Gen. Stannard's aids. Lieutenants Hooker and Benedict, 
and the bleeding from his wound — a singular and very severe one 
from the joint entrance, at the upper part of the thigh, of a minic 
ball and a twisted iron 7}ail — was stopped by the hands of Gen. 
Stannard and members of his staff". 

Gen. Crawford drove in the enemy's right at dusk, and took 
some prisoners ; but the battle, in fact, ended with the repulse of 
Pickett's great charge. Two or three of the enemy's batteries re- 
tained their places opposite our position till dark ; but it is now 
known that in their rear a scene of complete panic prevailed. 
Henry Cougdon, of Clarendon, Vt., a sharpshooter, then a prisoner 
behind the enemy's lines, states that the rebel forces of Gen, Lee's 
right started at once in full retreat, and could not be rallied till they 
found they were not followed. This is confirmed by the English 
eye-witness, on the rebel side, who wrote the account of the battle 
published in Blackwood's Magazine, in September, 18G3, who says: 
"It is diflScult to exaggerate the critical state of affairs as they ap- 
" peared about this time (subsequent to the repulse.) If the enemy 
" or their general had shown any enterprise, there is no saying what 
" might have happened." 

I go back again to note the share iu the battle taken by the 
other Vermont troops. The 1st Vermont Brigade, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th 
and 6th Vermont Regiments, under command of Col. L. A. Grant, 
rested at Manchester, Md., during the day and until midnight of 
July 1st, when it marched with the rest of the Gth Corps for the 
field. It reached there at 4 p. m. of Thursday, July 2d, by a forced 
march of thirty-two miles, the last ten of which were made at a 



22 

very rapid rate, to the sound of the gims that thundered from the 
hills of Gettysburgh, The battle was raging fiercely on the left as 
the corps came upon the ground ; and waiting only to close its ranks 
it was at once formed in line of battle as a support to the 5th Corps, 
then warmly engaged in its immediate front. The lines in front 
stood firm, and the brigade did not become engaged. Soon after 
dark the brigade was marched to the left, and took position near the 
foot of Round Top Hill. Next morning it was moved still further 
down, and formed the extreme left of our army, — its line of battle 
extending nearly at right angles with the main line. This responsi- 
ble position the 1st Brigade held till the close of the battle. Shot 
and shell, at times, on the 3d, fell along its line ; but the enemy did 
not reach its immediate front. Probably it would have been fiercely 
assailed on Friday afternoon had it not boon for an important diver- 
sion, effected by the cavalry, in which the 1st Vermont CaA'alry took 
a prominent part, as will be described hereafter. On the morning 
of Friday, July 3d, the 4th Vermont, Col. Stoughtcn, was deployed 
in front as skirmishers, and through their line some of the cavalry 
retreated after their repulse in the charge. On the morning of the 
4th, the rebels still maintaining their threateniiig position in front 
of our left, the 4th Vermont was ordered forward and drove in their 
skirmishers for a mile or more. On Sunday, the 5th, the brigade 
joined the 6th Corps, in its pursuit of the retreating enemy, until 
ho efi"ected his escape through the mountains. 

That Hood's Division, on Longstreet's extreme right, did not 
participate in the great rebel assault of Friday afternoon, is be- 
lieved to be due to the presence and daring of our cavalry. At 
four or five o'clock in the afternoon Gen. Farnswcrth, commanding 
a brigade of Gen. Kilpatrick's Division, which covered General 
Meade's left, was ordered to attack the enemy strongly posted be- 
hind same stone walls. With the 1st Virginia and 2d Battalion of 



23 

the 1st Vermont Cavalry he charged. Leaping a wall, under a 
severe fire, he dispersed the front line of the enemy, followed them 
through a field swept by hostile batteries, and succeeded in piercing 
through a second line, in the rear of which his force became dis- 
persed. Lieut. Col. Preston moved gallantly to his support with 
two squadrons of the 1st Vermont Cavalry, encountered a rebel 
regiment sent in to intercept the retreat of the first column, and, 
after a severe struggle, drove it from its position. The attack 
could not be maintained, however, and the cavalry withdrew, leav- 
ing behind them the brave Farnsworth and sevent3--fivc of the 
Vermont Cavalry killed and wounded; but having accomplished 
the important diversion intended, and having made one of the 
most gallant charges by cavalry on infantry in line, on record in 
the war. 

I have thus shown that at three important points in the field, 
and at two great crises of the battle, the presence and good behavior 
of Vermont troops had an important bearing on the final result. 
But something more than this may be justly claimed for them, viz : 
that the flank attack of the 2d Vervioiit Brigade decided the fate 
of the great rebel charge of Friday afternnon, and with it the issue 
of the battle. Disinterested testimony to this fact is given by the 
English and rebel correspondents, who certainly had no partialities 
to gratify on our side, and by the rebel officers taken prisoners. 
An account of the charge and its repulse, given in the Richmond 
Serdinel of July 13, 1863, contains the following passage : 

" The order was given at 3 o'clock, p. m., and the advance was 
"commenced, the infiintry marching at common time across the field, 
"and not firing a musket until within 75 yards of the enemy's works. 
"As Kemper's Brigade moved up it sicitng around to the left and 
'■'was exposed to the front and flanking fire of the Federals, n-hich 



^4 

"■was very fatal. This swinging around. unmasked a part of the 
"enemy's force, five regiments being jmshed out frnvi their hft to 
'■'■the attack.* Directly after this force "was unmasked, our artillery 
"opened on it with terrible precision, * * * *■ 

*' Seven Confederate flags were planted on the stone fence, but 
"there not being enough men to support them, they were captured 
"by the advancing Yankee force, and nearly all of our severely 
"wounded were left in the hands of the enemy. "■' '' * 

"The 1st Virginia carried in 175 men, about 25 having been 
"detained for ambulance and other dul}'. They brought out be- 
"tween 30 and 40, many even of them being Avounded. There was 
"but one officer of the reg'ment who was not killed or wounded, 
"and that was Lieut. Ballou, who now commands it." 

Another account, in the same paper, derived from the surviving 
officer of the 1st Virginia, says : 

"When the firing of cannon ceased, the order for the infantry 
"to advance was given, which was done at common time — no double- 
"quicking or cheering, but solemnly and steadily those veterans di- 
•' reeled their steps towards the heavy and compact columns of the 
"enemy. The skirmishers were at once engaged, the enemy having 
"a double line of skirmishers to oppose our single lino. The enemy 
"were driven from their position behind a stone fen^e, over which 
"entrenchments had been thrown up, and our forces occupied their 
"position about twenty minutes. About this time a fianlcing party 
'^ of the enemy, marching in a column hy regiments, teas throicn out 
"from the enemy's left on our extreme right, ivhich was held ly 
"Kemper's Brigade, and by an enfilading fii e forced the retirement 
"of our troops. ****** 

" With their repulse the heavy fighting of the day terminated 

*Thij overestimate of the number of the regiments making the flank attack was 
a very natural one. The ranks of the Vermont Regiments were quite full, con- 
taining at least double the average number of Ijayoncts in the regiments of the 
Army of the Potomao. 



25 

"Our loss here was heavy, and our forces, after the most desperate 
"fighting, were forced to fall back beyond the range of fire." 

The correspondent of the Richmond Enquirer, in a vivid ac- 
count of the charge, after stating that Pettigrcw's Division, on the 
left, first broke, adds : 

" Pickett is left alone to contend with the hordes of the enemy 
" pouring in on him on every side. Garnett falls, killed by a minie 
" ball, and Kemper, the brave and chivalrous, reels under a mortal 
" wound, and is taken to the rear. Now the enemy move around 
" strong flanking bodies of infantry, and are rapidly gaining 
" Pickett's rear. The enemy press heavily our retreating line, and 
" many noble spirits, who had passed safely through the advance 
"and charge, now fall on right and left. Armistead is wounded 
" and left in the enemy's hands. The shattered remnant of Wright's 
" Georgia Brigate is moved forward to cover their retreat, and the 
" fight closes here." 

Similar extracts might be multiplied ; but those given are suffi- 
cient to show that on the rebel side at least — and corroborative evi- 
dence is not wanting on our own* — the failure of the great rebel 
assault of Friday, and the consequent loss of the battle, was at- 
tributed to a flank attack on Pickett's right by several Federal 

*An order, issued from Division Headquarters, July 4th, returned the thanks of 
the Major General commanding, to the Vermont Second Brigade, "for their gallant 
" conduct in resisting in the front line, the main attack of the enemy upon this 
" position, after sustaining a tarrific fire from one hundred pioces of artillery," and 
congratulated them " upon contributing so essentially to the glorious victory of 
"yesterday." 

In Major General Doubleday's testimony before the Congressional Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, he says, after describing the flank attack: " The prisoners 
" stated that what ruined them was Stannard's Brigade on their flank, as they 
"found it impossible to contend with it in that position; and they drew ofiF, all in 
" a huddle, to get away from it." 

Bachelder says: " titanoard, whose brigade was at the front, moved it by the 
" right flank, changed front forward on iiist company, and with his Green Moun- 
" tain Boys opened a murderous fire upon their (tlie enemy's) exposed flank. The 
" effect was resistless. The ground lay thickly covered with killed and wounded; 
"hundreds, thousands, threw down their arms; while the broken, shattered mas8 
" sought refuge behind the hills from which they had emerged." 

Swinton gives substantially the same account. 

4 



26 

regiments. It is enough to add that the only troops which made, or 
claim to have made, such an attack, were those of Gen. Stannard's 
Vermont Brigade. 

The proper limits of this book, and its main purpose, which is 
simply to set down in plain, unvarnished record, the share taken by 
the Vermonters in the great battle, with such grouping of the other 
events as may show its true relation to the victorious issue, have 
forbidden me to attempt detailed allusion to acts of individual hero- 
ism ; or description of the scenes of the actual conflict, or of the 
sights witnessed by me Thursday night, during the whole of which — 
a bright, moonlight night — I rode, on a special duty, over the whole 
region within and to the rear of the lines of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, and through fields covered by the acre with wounded men, 
collected around the barns used for hospitals ; or of the sickening 
horrors after the battle, of a field on which lay more than seven 
thousand dead men and three thousand dead horses. 

A brief summary of the casualties is all that need be added. 
The magnitude and severity of the battle is strongly shown by the 
losses of general officers, much exceeding those in any other battle 
of the war. Of Gen. Meade's Army, Maj. General Reynolds and 
Brigadier Generals Weed, Zook and Farnsworth, and Colonels Vin- 
cent and Willard, commanding brigades, were killed ; Major Gen- 
erals Hancock, Sickles, and Brigadier Generals Barlow, Barnes, 
Gibbon, Graham, Paul, Stannard and Webb were wounded — fifteen 
in all. On the rebel side, Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, 
Pender and Semmes were killed, while Kemper, shot through the 
spine, lived but the wreck of a man, and Pettigrew, wounded, sur- 
vived the great charge, to be slain in the sequel to the battle at 
Falling Waters ; and Generals Anderson, Hampton, Heth, Hood, 



Johnson, Jenkins, Jones, Kemper, Kimball, Eobertson, Scales and 
Trimble were wounded — eighteen in all. 

The greatest rebel loss of general officers, in any previous bat- 
tle, was three killed and eight wounded, at Antietam. 

Gen. Meade's casualties, including the skirmishes following the 
battle, (in one of which, at Funkstown, the 1st Vermont Brigade 
repulsed with a skirmish line a full line-of-battle attack, losing 
nine killed and fifty-nine wounded), were, as officially stated, 2,834 
killed ; 13,709 wounded, and 6,643 missing. 

Gen. Lee made no official report of his losses ; but it is known 
that over 5,000 rebel dead were buried on or near the field ; that 
7,600 severely wounded rebels, left in our hands, were registered in 
the Gettysburgh hospitals ; that the total of rebel prisoners taken 
was 13,621 ; and that 2,100 wagons loaded with his wounded, 
taken with him on his retreat, were counted as they passed through 
Greencastle, Pa. The aggregate of killed and wounded on both 
sides probably fell little short of 8,000 killed and 35,000 wounded, 
rivaling the carnage of Waterloo, and exceeding by 10,000 the 
total of casualties at Solferino, the bloodiest foreign battle of this 
generation. 

Gen. Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania cost him one.tkird of 
his army. His success at Gettysburgh would doubtless have been 
the signal for organized outbreaks of the Northern allies of the 
Confederacy in Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York ; it would 
have assured the fall of the National capital, and the recognition of 
foreign powers for the Confederacy. His failure was the failure of 
the rebellion. 




I 



APPENDIX 



In the Oration delivered before the Re-union Society of Ver- 
mont Ofi&cers, November 4th, 1869, by Lieut. Col. W. W. Grout, 
in the Hall of the House of Representatives at Montpelier, the 
Orator asserted that Gen. Sickles, on the evening of the first day of 
the battle of Gettysburgh, "saved the remnant of the ]st Corps 
from utter annihilation, and the 11th Corps the necessity of further 
running." He also asserted that General Sickles' action on the 
second day of the battle, by precipitating the fighting, prevented 
General Meade from carrying out a purpose to withdraw his army 
from Gettysburgh and thus " drew to wreck the argosy of the Re- 
bellion." 

The occasion on which this oration was delivered, and the fact 
that it was printed by order of the Legislature of Vermont, makes 
it proper that some correction of such distortion of the history of 
the battle, and exaltation of a corps commander at the expense of 
the commander of the army, should come from a Vermont pen, and 
that it should be put on more permanent record than (as it originally 
appeared) in the columns of a newspaper. 

The distortion alluded to consists in the undue proportion given 
to General Sickles in the oration, which contains none but faint 
and incidental allusions to any other corps commander ; and to the 
impression given by it that Gen. Sickles' corps (the 3d army corps) 
was the first and only force that reached Cemetery Hill in time to 
prevent annihilation of the 1st and lith corps on Wednesday eve- 
ning. It is true that when Gen. Sickles heard that the First and Ele- 
venth corps were fighting superior numbers and in danger of de- 
struction on Wednesday afternoon, he marched to their assistance, as 
he would have been a craven and a traitor not to have done. But 
his was by no means the first or the only corps that reinforced the 
1st and 11th that night. On the contrary all the corps of the Army 
save the Sixth concentrated at Gettysburgh on Wednesday night, 
and the first to arrive was a division not of the 3d, but of the 12th 
corps. Gen. Slocum. 

It is to be remembered that an army corps, proceeding by nar- 
row and often impeded roads, could not quite march on to the field in 
a body, as a company marches into line on dress parade. The va- 



II 

rious corps reached Gettjsburgh by various roads, and portions of 
some of them were coming in at the same time with portions of others. 

Geary's division of Slocum's corps arrived just after the rem- 
nants' of the 1st and 11th corps established their position on Ceme- 
tery Hill, — about 4 o'clock — and the last of the l2th corps arrived 
about 6 o'clock. The first division of the 3d Corps arrived at 
5 o'clock, according to the testimony of Gen. Birney, its commander, 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, The larger part 
of the remainder of the 3d corps did not arrive till one o'clock 
Thursday morning, and the last brigade of the 3d corps did not 
arrive till nine o'clock that morning. 

The order of arrival of the various corps upon the ground, was 
mainly determined by their respective distances from it when the 
fighting opened. It is true that Gen. Slocum did not start very 
promptly when called on by Gen. Howard for succor. But he did 
move and his troops were naturally the first to reinforce Howard 
from the circumstance that they had but three or four miles to march. 
The 3d corps, in spite of superior promptness in starting, could not 
get up till later, for they had ten miles to march. The 2d Corps, 
having thirteen miles to march, (from Taneytown) came next. The 
5th corps, tiventy-three miles away when the order came, arrived 
next ; and the 6tli corps, which marched the hardest and fastest of 
all, arrived last, because it had thirty-six miles to cover, from its 
camp at Manchester to the field. 

Furthermore there is no reason to suppose that the enemy 
would have attempted to storm Cemetery Hill, on Wednesday night, 
if Gen. Sickles had not arrived. On the other hand there is clear 
testimony that the portions of Lee's army engaged during the first 
day, had had fighting enough for that day at its close, and were con- 
tent to rest with the success they had achieved. It will be enough 
to quote on this point the opinions of two or three generals entitled 
to especial weight. Gen, Sickles himself says, in his published testi- 
mony ; " I found his (Howard's) troops well posted in a secure posi- 
" tion. The enemy, in the meanwhile, had not made any serious 
" attack on him during my march," — that is in the three hours pre- 
ceding his arrival — pretty good ground for supposition that the 
enemj did not purpose to renew the attack that night. Gen. Wads- 
worth, of the 1st corps, says : " We think that we punished the 
enemy so severely in that contest, and that they lost so heavily, that 
they were in no condition to continue the attack after we had retired 
to Cemetery Hill." Col. Freemantle, of the English army, who 
wrote the account of the battle as seen from the rebel side, published 
in Blackwood's Mayazinc, explains the fixilure of Ewell to assault 
Cemetery Hill that night by the fact that " the enemy was too 
strongly posted." Finally, Gen. Lee says in his report : " It was 
" ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two 
" corps of the array formerly commanded by Gen. Hooker, and that 
" the remainder of that array, under Gen. Meade, was approaching 



Ill 



" Gettysburgh. Without information as to its proximit}', the strong 
" position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked with- 
" out danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened 
"and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming 
" numbers of fresh troops. * * * Under these circumstances, it 
" was decided not to attack till the arrival of Lomjstreet,'" — who did 
not arrive that night. The slight attack made by the enemy, on 
"Wednesday evening, was not repulsed by Gen. Sickles, or any por- 
tion of his command. There is, therefore, no justice or propriety in 
making sole mention of him, as par excellence the succorer of the 
First and Eleventh corps on Wednesday night. 

Again, it is asserted in Col. Grout's oration that Gen. Sickles' 
advance movement precipitated the second day's fighting, and that it 
was that fighting which turned Gen. Meade from his purpose to re- 
treat from Gettysburgh, and thus made it the Waterloo of the War. 

Upon this point it is to be noted that the famous " advance 
movement" and repulse of Gen. Sickles was not one of those events 
which form a stage of progress for one side or the other in a battle; 
but was in the main an isolated aifair. It was the leaving by the 
3d corps of a very good Hue with both flanks protected, ibr a less 
favorable position in front, with unprotected flanks. Its results were 
that the corps though aided by troops of the 2nd and 5th corps and 
reserve artillery, was driven from the position with terrible loss ; 
that our troops held at the close of the day exactly the position they 
would have held had Sickles not moved out, with this difl'erence, that 
the ground for half a mile out in front of that line was covered with 
the bodies of Union soldiers, who would otherwise have been in the 
ranks ; and that the enemy occupied some ground which he would 
have occupied anyway, with the additional satisfaction, to be sure, 
that he had driven our troops from it, with far greater loss than he 
had received. Now what was there in this to keep Meade at Gettys- 
burgh, supposing he had been, as asserted, "intent on tailing back?" 
Was it the simple fact that there was fighting on our left ? But 
there would have been fighting on our left without that. The 
authority for this assertion is Gen. Lee, who states in his report of 
the battle that the success of his troops in the first day's fighting en- 
couraged him to renew the oflensive on the second day, and that he 
ordered Longstreet to drive our troops from the position occupied by 
Sickles (his advanced line), with a view to " assailing the more ele- 
vated ground beyond." This more elevated ground was the ridge 
from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top, which it is thus i)lain 
would have been assailed on Thursday afternoon even though Gen. 
Sickles had not gone out exactly where the enemy wanted him. Or 
was it our heavy loss, more than half of the entire loss of the U. S. 
army in the whole battle, the consequence of Sickles' mistake, that 
kept Gen. Meade at Gettysburgh ? Disaster commonly adds motives 
for flight to a general already bent on retreat. 



IV 

But was Gen. Meade " intent on falling back" ? The orator's 
opinion that he was, is doubtless based on the testimony of Gen. 
Daniel Butterfield before the Committee on the Conduct or the War, 
to the effect that he was ordered by Gen, Meade on the morning of 
July 2d to prepare an order to withdraw the army from Gettysburgh. 
That Butterfield drew up such an order is not questioned ; but it 
was never issued, and Gen. Meade denies that it was drawn up by 
bis direction. Gen. Meade's declaration before the Committee is as 
follows : 

I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in 
the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall 
be made known — I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one in- 
stant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the 
future should develop, during the course of the day, might render it a matter 
of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. 

This declaration is corroborated not only by the testimony of 
reliable officers, but by the strong logic of undisputed facts. Gen. 
Williams, Adjutant General of the army, through whom all such 
orders were issued, and who was certainly in as good position as 
Butterfield to know the intentions of his chief, testifies as follows : 

" I think that as soon as Gen. Meade learned the general result of the 
engagement on the 1st of July in front of Gettysburgh, and the character of 
the ground at Gettysburgh, he made up his mind to fight the battle at that 
place, and he concentrated the army there with all possible rapidity. * * 
I have no idea that he could for a moment have entertained the idea of with- 
drawing, except as a last extremity." 

This is confirmed by the evidence of Gen. Hunt, chief of artil- 
lery, of Gen. Hancock, of Gen. Gibbon, and other officers. It is 
supported by the order books of the army, which do not contain any 
such order as that described by Butterfield ; but which do contain 
an order to Gen. Slocum, sent to him by Gen. Meade, at 10 o'clock, 
A. M., of July 2d, directing him to make arrangements for a "strong 
and decisive attack" from his front on the enemy, to be made by the 
12th corps, supported by the 5th and with the co-operation of the 
6th corps. It is simply inconceivable that Gen. Meade could have 
issued this order, if he had been " intent on falling back." The at- 
tack, however, was not made, as Gen. Warren, Chief Engineer, after 
examining the ground, reported it to be inadvisable. 

One of the " contingencies'' alluded to by Gen. Meade, doubt- 
less, was the possibility that the enemy might choose not to remain in 
front of Gettysburgh, either to attack or to be attacked, but, instead, 
to move upon Gen. Meade's lines of communication. Gen. Long- 
street, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank posted 
on the Emmettsburgh road — really between the Army of the Potomac 
and Washington — and by marching toward Frederick, he could have 
compelled Meade to withdraw from Gettysburgh. Nor is this mere 
speculation. Swiuton, in his Army of the Potomac, says that. Gen. 
Longstreet told him that be begged Lee in vain to be allowed to ex- 



IV 

ecute this very movement. Here was a contingency which Gen. 
Meade, as a wise and cautious general, could not overlook ; and u 
dispatch from him to Gen. Halleck, at Washington, is on record, 
showing not only his appreciatiuu of his ,si(u;if ion, Imt his determin- 
atiou to fight, defensively if he could, but oiFensively rather than not 
at all, at Gettysburyh. In this dispatch, dated July 2d, at 3 P. M., 
the very hour when Col. Gruut would have us believe he had called 
his corps commanders together to submit an order fur retreat — Gen. 
Meade says : 

"I have to-day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy. 1 
have a strong position for defence. He has been moving on both my flanks, 
apparently; but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed 
atlackuig to allow the 6th corp? and parts of other corps to reach tliis place, 
and to rest the men. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information 
of the position of the enemy which will justify me m so doing, / shall at- 
tack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied that the enemy is endea- 
voring to move to my rear, and interpose between me and Washington, I shall 
fall back," &c. 

The conclusion is irresistible that whatever mistakes Gen. 
Meade made at Gettysburgh, a purpose to withdraw his army with- 
out a fight or before he was compelled to, was not one of them : ami 
that the fame of Gren. Sickles, tor conscious or unconscious achieve- 
ments in the Battle of Gettysburgh, must rest on something el.se than 
the prevention by him of the retreat of our army. 



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